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1 
Abstract 
Mortality change roils period rates. In the short term, conventional calculations of age-
specific probabilities of death and life expectancy in the period immediately after the 
change depend on how many lives have been saved. In the long term, the probabilities 
and period life expectancy also depend on how long these lives have been saved. When 
mortality is changing, calculations of period life expectancy do not, except in special 
circumstances, measure the life expectancy of a cohort of newborns that hypothetically 
live all their lives under the new mortality regime.  
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1. Introduction  
When a life is saved, how long is death averted? When death rates are declining, how 
should period lifetables be estimated? This demographic essay explains why and how 
the answer to the second question hinges on the answer to the first. My thinking was 
stimulated by the pathbreaking research by Bongaarts and Feeney (2002; 2003; 2005) 
on why conventional calculations may lead to distorted estimates of period life 
expectancy. 
The conventional formula for period life expectancy at current death rates can be 
expressed as  
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where  ) (x µ  is the force of mortality (hazard of death) at age x as estimated from 
observed counts of age-specific deaths and the age-specific population at risk. In 
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where  ) (
* x µ  is the force of mortality that would be experienced by a cohort of 
newborns that lived all their lives under the mortality regime that prevailed at the time 
of their birth (Vaupel 2002). Note that this concept of life expectancy under current 
conditions is a period measure based on the hypothetical notion that the mortality 
regime at the time of the cohort’s birth continues unchanged until the last member of 
the cohort dies. 
It is helpful to consider a special, simple case. Suppose that there is a mortality 
regime that prevails up until some point in time after which a new mortality regime 
prevails. Although there may have been human populations in the past that lived under 
a more or less fixed mortality regime, a sudden but long-term shift from one regime to 
another may rarely if ever been experienced. In contemporary human populations 
mortality conditions are changing incessantly. In laboratory experiments, however, with 
non-human populations, it is possible to switch from one mortality regime to another. 
For instance, many experiments have been performed with animals such as fruit flies or 
mice that are given one kind of diet up until some point and a different kind of diet 
afterwards (e.g., Mair et al. 2003, Carey et al. 1998). The Max Planck Institute for 
Demographic Research houses a lightbulb laboratory in which large numbers of small Demographic Research: Volume 13, Article 24 
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bulbs can be lit at either 5 or 6 volts. A population of lightbulbs can be kept under harsh 
6 volt conditions until some moment and then at a more salubrious 5 volts thereafter. 
To simply the exposition, it is also helpful to make three other assumptions. The 
number of births in the population during each time interval is assumed to be constant. 
The population is assumed to be closed to migration. And the new mortality regime is 
assumed to be more favorable than the old regime. In particular, every individual under 
the new conditions would live at least as long as under the older conditions and some 
individuals would live longer. Again, such assumptions do not pertain to actual human 
populations, but they can be achieved in laboratory experiments. So it is possible to 
imagine a concrete instance of the kind of mortality shift I will consider in this paper—
think, e.g., about laboratory flies fed a poor diet and then a better diet or about 
lightbulbs lit at 6 volts and then at 5 volts. In any case, the assumptions are not of 
fundamental importance. The theory can be generalized. The assumptions, however, 
drastically simplify the exposition of the theory. 
Consider age-specific death rates in the interval right after the shift from the 
unfavorable mortality regime to the favorable regime. To be specific, consider 
lightbulbs during the day after voltage has been lowered from 6 to 5 volts. Suppose that 
the population of lightbulbs consists of different cohorts that were turned on on 
different days. Let  ) (x µ  in formula (1) above be the force of mortality for bulbs that 
were turned on x days ago, as estimated from observations of how many bulbs died 
over the course of the day. Then  o e ,  life expectancy at current rates, can be calculated 
using (1). Suppose a cohort of lightbulbs is illuminated at 5 volts until the last bulb 
fails. If laboratory conditions are held constant, then observations of this cohort can be 
used to estimate  ) (
* x µ  in formula (2) and hence 
*
o e , life expectancy under current 
conditions. The main thrust of this article is to demonstrate that, except in special 
circumstances, ) (x µ  will not equal  ) (
* x µ  and hence  o e will differ from 
*
o e . Annette 
Baudisch, Jutta Gampe, Mieke Reuser, Dirk Vieregg and I are currently conducting 
lightbulb experiments to provide empirical evidence for this assertion; in this article I 
will present the theoretical case.  
Vaupel, Manton and Stallard (1979) considered populations of individuals that are 
heterogeneous with respect to their age-specific chances of death. They showed that if 
mortality conditions are changing, then life expectancy at current rates does not, except 
in special circumstances, equal life expectancy under current conditions, i.e., that 
*
o o e e ≠ . They developed a model of gamma-distributed frailty (i.e., relative risk of 
death) and used it to derive formulas for 
* µ  and 
*
o e . Further research (e.g., Vaupel and 
Yashin 1985, 1987a, 1987b; Vaupel, Yashin and Manton 1988; and Vaupel 2002) 
extends this line of thinking to other kinds of models of heterogeneous populations. The Vaupel: Lifesaving, lifetimes and lifetables  
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fundamental concept of these models is that a cohort’s mortality at some age depends 
not only on current conditions but also on the historical conditions the cohort has 
suffered. 
Bongaarts and Feeney (2002) formulated a delayed-death model such that health 
improvements in some year add an increment δ  to the remaining lifespans of everyone 
over 30. Note that this increment does not depend on the mortality history of a 
population but only on a change in current conditions. In the delayed-death model it is 
also the case that, except in special circumstances, 
*
o o e e ≠ . Bongaarts and Feeney 
(2002, 2003, 2005) suggest various formulas for estimating 
*
o e . Some scholars think 
that these formulas are problematic (e.g., Wachter 2005). I will not consider this issue 
here, but I will show that Bongaarts and Feeney’s basic point, that 
*
o o e e ≠  , is correct. 
The general conclusion of the present article is that
*
o o e e ≠  (and  ) ( ) (
* x x µ µ ≠ ) 
under much broader circumstances than those considered by Vaupel, Manton and 
Stallard (1979) or by Bongaarts and Feeney (2002, 2003, 2005). A discrepancy can 
arise whenever mortality conditions are changing.  The two life expectancies will differ 
when lives saved at age x are extended by an average increment that is not equal to 
remaining life expectancy at age x at current death rates. Furthermore, the two life 
expectancies will differ when lives lost at age x are shortened by an average decrement 
that is not equal to conventionally-calculated remaining life expectancy at age x.  
Bongaarts and Feeney’s delayed-death model and the various models of heterogeneity 
in innate and acquired frailty are special cases.  
 
 
2. How saving a life alters life expectancy 
Consider a stylized population with constant age-specific death rates. Suppose that the 
population is closed to migration and that the number of births each year is constant. 
Suppose that at some age x in some year y a life is saved. How will the conventional 
lifetable for that year differ from the lifetable for previous years? The answer is easily 





1 + + ⋅
−










e ,           ( 3 )  
 
where  x e is remaining life expectancy at age x,  x N  is the number of individuals who 
celebrate their xth birthday in year y and x D is the number of deaths among those Demographic Research: Volume 13, Article 24 
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individuals. This formula is consistent with conventional lifetable methods and from the 
values of   x e  age-specific death rates and other lifetable statistics can be calculated.  In 
this formulation  x e  is calculated using data for Lexis rhombuses that extend from the 
start of year y to the end of year y+1, but other formulations based on Lexis squares or 
on Lexis rhombuses that stretch over two years of age and one year of time could also 
be used.  
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Subtracting (3) from (4) yields 
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If  x n deaths are averted, then 
). 5 . 0 ( 1
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The expression  1 5 . 0 + + x e can be interpreted as the remaining life expectancy of 
someone whose life was saved at age x (under the assumption that such a life is saved, 
on average, halfway through the year.) 
The implication of (5b) is clear and important: conventional lifetable calculations 
are consistent with the assumption that when lives are saved at some age x  the 
beneficiaries gain, on average, the remaining life expectancy at that age. More 
precisely, the assumption is that each beneficiary will face the same age-specific 
hazards of death for the remainder of his or her life as those faced by individuals with 
lifespans greater than x.  
The actual average lifespan gained by the resuscitated may, however, be more or 
less than remaining life expectancy. To be concrete let  1 5 . 0 + + x e equal ten but suppose 
that each resuscitated individual dies one year after being saved. Further suppose that 
x x N n /  is one percent. Then conventional calculations yield an increase in remaining 
life expectancy at age x of a tenth of a year whereas the actual gain is only a hundredth 
of a year. In other words, conventional calculations lead to a distorted estimate of real 
life expectancy. Vaupel: Lifesaving, lifetimes and lifetables  
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Before analyzing this distortion further, it is useful to consider mortality 
improvements at several ages. Suppose that  x n deaths are averted at age x and that  1 + x n  

























































x e  depends on 
*
1 + x e   rather than on  1 + x e . More generally, if mortality 
improvements are made at older ages, then persons whose lives are saved at some 
younger age are assumed to gain, on average, the remaining life expectancy at this age 
taking into account the progress at older ages. 
 
 
3. Individual lifetimes 
To further explore why and when 
*
o o e e ≠ , the notion of individual lifetimes is useful. 
Let  i X be the lifetime (i.e., age at death) of some specific individual i. Let  ) , ( y x X i  be 
the total lifetime of this individual if he or she survives to age x in year y, under the 
assumption that the mortality conditions prevailing in year y persist for the rest of the 
individual’s life. Hence  ) , 0 ( o i y X  is the age at which the individual would die if 
mortality conditions remain the same as in the individual’s year of birth  o y . 
Suppose mortality is being reduced. For simplicity assume that mortality levels 
remain the same from year  o y  to just before year y and then fall suddenly. Suppose that 
individual i survives to age x in year y. Let 
− x  and 
− y denote the individual’s exact age 
and the exact time just prior to the mortality improvement. Because before year y there 
is no change in death rates,  ) , 0 ( ) , ( o i i y X y x X =
− − . Mortality improvement means 
that for at least some individuals ) , ( ) , (
− − > y x X y x X i i . 
Kenneth Wachter suggested a helpful way of thinking about this model. Imagine 
that each individual is given a ticket at birth that entitles the person to a specific 
lifespan. This lifespan at the time of birth  o y  is denoted above by ) , 0 ( o i y X . Demographic Research: Volume 13, Article 24 
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Individuals keep their lifespan tickets until time y . Some may die before this time. 
Among the survivors, some and perhaps all individuals get a new ticket with a new 
lifespan, namely the lifespan denoted above by  ). , ( y x X i  Because the new mortality 
regime is assumed to persist indefinitely, individuals keep their new lifespan until 
death. Babies born at time  y  get tickets that are consistent with the new mortality 
regime. All babies born at any time after  y  similarly get tickets that are consistent with 
the new mortality regime. Consider three possibilities. 
First, suppose everyone’s life is extended by some increment δ : 
 
δ + =
− − ) , ( ) , ( y x X y x X i i .           ( 8 )  
 
This is the elegantly simple model suggested by Bongaarts and Feeney (2002, 2003, 
2005). The increment δ  would be gained not only by everyone alive at time y, but also 
by all future generations. One way to capture this notion is to allow x to be negative. If 
x is negative, then the person will be born in x years. 
Second, suppose that all individuals henceforth age at a slower pace such that time 
in the future is stretched out by the factor 1+ρ : 
 
). ) , ( )( 1 ( ) , ( x y x X x y x X i i − + + =
− − ρ          ( 9 a )  
 
This model can also be formulated as: 
 
, ) , ( ) , ( i i i y x X y x X δ + =




). ) , ( ( x y x X i i − ⋅ =
− − ρ δ        ( 9 c )  
 
Note that the increment i δ   depends on how much longer the individual would have 
lived under the conditions prevailing before the mortality improvement. As in the case 
of constant δ , the mortality improvement would benefit future generations as well as 
those alive at time y. 
Third, suppose that some individuals gain from the mortality improvement and 
some do not. In particular, suppose that there is a chance π  that a specific individual’s 
life will be extended and a corresponding chance  1-π  that the individual’s life will not 
be extended. That is, suppose Vaupel: Lifesaving, lifetimes and lifetables  
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π δ = + =




π − = =
− − 1 )} , ( ) , ( Pr{ y x X y x X i i ,         ( 1 0 b )  
 
where Pr{…} denotes “probability of” and the increment  i δ is greater than zero. Further 
suppose that  i δ  is a random variable that has the same distribution as the distribution of 
remaining lifespans at age  i X . That is, suppose that when the life is saved of an 
individual who would have died at some age  i X , then this individual thereafter faces 
the same life chances as individuals whose lifespans are greater than  i X . If  i δ  is the 
expected value of  i δ , then i δ equals remaining life expectancy at age  i X . Hence, 
individuals whose lives are saved at age X gain, on average, the remaining life 
expectancy at age X. This model is consistent with the conventional approach to 
estimating life expectancy, as shown above. 
Note that in all three cases the individual does not have to be on the verge of death. 
That is,  i X  may be larger than x. A person who would have died at some age in some 
future year might have the scythe of death averted in an earlier year. Indeed, as noted 
above, the person might not even be born yet. (If Xi is smaller than x, then the individual 
has died and the improvement is too late.) 
 
 
4. The triangle of turbulence 
The three special cases described above are illustrative of the range of possibilities. It is 
also useful to consider a stylized model of the general situation. Consider a hypothetical 
population that is closed to migration. The number of births each year is constant. Until 
year 0 an unchanging mortality regime has prevailed for longer than any individual has 
lived. Then, on January 1
st of that year, a new, more favorable mortality regime starts 
and persists for longer than the maximum lifespan of individuals in the population. Let  
) (x Dy   denote the number of deaths over the course of year y among those who were x 
years old on January 1
st of that year. Note that  ) (x Dy is the number of individuals such 
that 1 ) , ( + < ≤ x y x X x i .  Let 
o
y D  denote the number of deaths of babies who are born 
in year y and who die the same year.  Assume that for any two years  , 0 , 0 2 1 < < y y  Demographic Research: Volume 13, Article 24 
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when the old mortality regime prevailed,  ) ( ) (





2 1 = . (In a study 
of empirical data, stochastic variation would have to be considered, but the purpose of 
the stylized model here is cogent exposition rather than statistical analysis.) For cohorts 
born in any two years,  , 0 , 0 2 1 ≥ ≥ y y when the new mortality regime prevails, 
) ( ) (





2 1 = . The values of interest lie in a triangle on the x,y 
plane, the triangle bounded by the x axis at y=0 and by the diagonal cohort line along 
which x=y. There can be a turbulent pattern of death counts in this triangle even though 
the entire triangle lies in the domain of the new mortality regime. 
To understand this, consider the number of lives saved in the first year of the new 
mortality regime among those who are x years old when the new regime starts on 
January 1
st of year 0. The number is simply  ). ( ) ( 0 1 x D x D − −  This difference gives the 
number of individuals who would have died under the old regime who do not die under 
the new regime. In terms of the ticket concept, it is the number of individuals who get a 
new ticket that entitles them to a longer life such that they do not die in the year that 
they would have died if they had not gotten a new ticket. Because the number of 
individuals who are age x on January 1
st of year 0 equals the number on January 1
st of 
year -1, the values of   ) ( ) ( 0 1 x D x D − −  determine the gain in conventionally-calculated 
life expectancy,  ) 1 ( ) 0 ( − − o o e e .  The number of lives saved, however, does not reveal 
the increment of additional lifespan that is gained by the resuscitated. As discussed 
above, conventional calculations assume that the increment is determined by the 
remaining lifespans of those who lives were not saved but this may not be the case.  
In all years after time 0 a constant mortality regime prevails and there is a constant 
number of births each year and no migration. So why should the number of deaths at 
some age vary from year to year? In particular, why should the number of deaths at 
each age in each year not be the same as the number at the age in year 0? The reason is 
that individuals whose lives were saved in year 0 are dying in various years and at 
various ages and these postponed deaths are adding to the death count. Under the new 
mortality regime some individuals who would have died after year 0 also are gaining 
lifespan extensions. As those resuscitated in year 0 and subsequent years die, they add 
to death counts. 
Except in special cases, notably the conventional life expectancy model, the 
shifting pattern of age-specific death counts will result in changing values of age-
specific death rates in the triangle and changing values of conventionally-calculated 
period life expectancy. The mortality regime changes on January 1
st of year 0, but there 
is a wake of mortality turbulence that lingers on, gradually diminishing, until it 
completely peters out after the death of the last individual born under the old mortality 
regime whose lifespan was extended under the new regime.   Vaupel: Lifesaving, lifetimes and lifetables  
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5. How large is the distortion? 
How distorted is the conventional calculation of life expectancy when death rates are 
declining? The results above show that the answer depends on how long death is 
averted. As noted earlier, Bongaarts and Feeney (2002) suggest an ingenious estimate. 
Let ) 1 , 1 ( − − y x Xi  be the total lifetime, under the mortality regime prevailing in year y-
1, of an individual who attains age x-1 at the start of year y-1 and who survives to reach 
age x at the start of year y.  Suppose there are improvements in health conditions at the 
start of year y that benefit everyone equally. That is, suppose the new age at death is 
 
, ) 1 , 1 ( ) , ( δ + − − = y x X y x X i i      all i.             ( 1 1 )  
 
Then if deaths are uniformly distributed over the course of a year, the number of lives 
saved is  x x D n ⋅ = δ . If, for instance, δ is 0.25 (i.e., three months), then one-quarter of 
deaths would be averted (namely, all the deaths from October 1 through December 31. 
In this view, health improvements delay death equally for everyone. 
This is an extreme assumption—and an elegant one. It can be relaxed by letting 
δ vary with age and letting δ vary, in the interval  1 0 < ≤ δ , across individuals.  
These are details. The key idea is that annual health progress lets many people gain 
a short additional span of life. Conventional lifetable calculations, in contrast, are 
consistent with the notion that lifesaving helps a few people gain (on average) a long 
increment of life, namely, remaining life expectancy at the age when they would have 
died. 
If deaths are being delayed by a fraction of a year δ  each year, then  ) (
* y eo , the 
true life expectancy at birth in year y, is given by 
 




* ) ) 1 /( ) , ( exp( ) ( da dx y x y e
a
o .      (12) 
 
Note that the starting age 0 might be age 30 or some other age after which the delayed-
death model is assumed to hold. As described above, death counts are assumed to be 
reduced by the factorδ , so the “observed” force of mortality has to be adjusted by 
dividing by 1-δ .  Bongaarts and Feeney suggested several approaches to estimating δ , 
reviewed by Bongaarts (2005). The validity of the estimates is controversial, as 
discussed by Wachter (2005). Further research is needed to resolve the issues. It seems 
likely, however, that if conventionally-calculated life expectancy is increasing, say, at a 
quarter of a year per year because of a uniform delay in deaths, then δ  is probably Demographic Research: Volume 13, Article 24 
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close to 0.25. If so,  ) (
* y eo can be two or three years less than  ) (y eo , as argued by 
Bongaarts and Feeney (2002, 2003).  
 
 
6. Considerations about true life expectancy 
The true life expectancy of a synthetic cohort living under current mortality conditions 
might not be as low as the delayed-death model suggests. It might, however, be lower 
than conventional lifetable calculations imply. The issues here are complicated and 
require extensive research. Let me adumbrate some key considerations. 
If life expectancy in some year is defined as the value implied by current death 
rates using the conventional formula, then life expectancy cannot be considered 
distorted. It is simply the value implied by current rates. Demographers, however, 
usually describe life expectancy as the average lifespan of a synthetic cohort of 
individuals who live all their lives under current mortality conditions. Life expectancy 
under current mortality conditions may not be equal to life expectancy calculated using 
current mortality rates. As explained above, a discrepancy can arise when mortality 
changes. When death rates are decreasing, then life expectancy under current mortality 
conditions is less than life expectancy under current mortality rates if those whose 
deaths are averted have a remaining lifespan that is less than the remaining life 
expectancy implied by conventional calculations. The bigger the difference between the 
actual increments in lifespans and lifetable values of remaining life expectancies, the 
bigger the discrepancy. A similar kind of discrepancy, of opposite sign, can arise when 
death rates are increasing. 
At some ages (e.g., infancy and childhood) most of the lives saved, at least 
historically and perhaps also today, may have been extended for many years. Bongaarts 
and Feeney acknowledge this and apply their delayed-death approach only after age 30, 
after 1950, and in developed countries. 
At least some mortality improvements have occurred because specific causes of 
death have been reduced. To the extent that some people were at higher risk than others, 
then a fraction of the population gained substantial increments of life. LeBras (2005) 
discusses this.  
Bongaarts and Feeney (2002, 2003) show that in developed countries the age-
specific force of mortality after age 30 can be approximated by parallel Gompertz 
curves that shift outward to higher ages over time. This finding is consistent with the 
delayed-death model and the notion that health progress is helping everyone above 30 
more or less uniformly. If lifesaving were due to multiple actions that reduced various 
causes of death at various ages, then a more complicated pattern of change in age-
specific mortality might be expected. Vaupel: Lifesaving, lifetimes and lifetables  
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The notion that general improvements in health conditions are delaying death 
uniformly for everyone does, however, have an implication that may be questionable in 
some circumstances.  The delayed-death model assumes that everyone benefits from the 
delay—at all ages (at least above 30) and even if a person would not have died for 
many years. Hence, a 60 year-old who would otherwise have died this year and a 
newborn who would have died at age 60 some 60 years from now are both assumed to 
gain the same extension of life. The newborn, however, will enjoy the improved health 
conditions for six decades before benefiting whereas the 60 year-old hardly experiences 
the improved conditions. Whether this is important depends on the nature of the 
mortality improvement. If, for instance, the improvement is a drug that adds three 
months between the onset of a disease and death, then the delayed-death model would 
be appropriate.   
Finally, let me highlight an implausible implication of the conventional lifetable 
approach. The implication was discussed in an article on “Repeated Resuscitation: How 
Lifesaving Alters Life Tables” (Vaupel and Yashin 1987a). Suppose death rates are 
lower at every age in some year compared with some previous year. A person who lived 
his or her entire life under the better mortality conditions might benefit from not dying 
at the age he or she would have died under the inferior conditions. This person might 
also benefit at a later age from the lifesaving implied by the lower death rates. Hence, 
the person might be repeatedly resuscitated. The article provides formulas and several 
examples. Here let me quote a single example. Consider the simple case such that death 
rates in the more favorable mortality regime are half as high, at all ages, as in the less 
favorable regime. Then, as explained by Vaupel and Yashin (1987a), “at the moment 
death would have occurred, half of the individuals are reprieved—and the other half die 
as before…. [H]alf of the cohort do not benefit from lifesaving....” That is, life 
expectancy at birth for those whose lives are not saved is the life expectancy under the 
unfavorable mortality regime. It seems implausible to me, at least under the conditions 
that have recently prevailed in developed countries, that mortality improvements that 
cut death rates in half would be of no direct benefit to half the population. The halving 
of death rates would be achieved as a result of substantial improvements in health and 
such improvements would probably, it seems to me, help nearly everyone live at least a 
bit longer.  
These various considerations suggest that both the conventional lifetable approach 
and the delayed-death model may be extreme cases. On the one hand, it seems unlikely 
that mortality improvements result in death being averted for a few people who gain, on 
average, remaining life expectancy. Those whose lives are saved probably tend to be 
relatively frail or vulnerable and their remaining lifetimes are probably, on average, 
shorter than the remaining life expectancy of those not rescued from death. On the other 
hand, it also seems unlikely that mortality improvements give everyone the same Demographic Research: Volume 13, Article 24 
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lifespan increment, regardless of age and regardless of how long an individual will live 
under the new health regime. It is therefore useful to consider other models. One 
approach is provided by models of heterogeneity in innate or acquired frailty, as I 
discussed in an earlier reflexion on Bongaarts and Feeney’s contributions (Vaupel, 
2002). Another approach is sketched below. 
 
 
7. A model of stretched lifetimes 
For cold-blooded animals life runs more slowly when temperatures are lower. In 
particular, the trajectory of age-specific death rates is stretched out over a longer period 
of time at lower vs. higher temperatures (Mair, Goymer, Pletcher, Partridge 2003). 
Reliability engineers use “accelerated-failure-time models” to describe this kind of 
phenomenon. It is a misleading term from the perspective of this article because the 
focus here is on reductions rather than increases in mortality. Hence, I will refer to 
“stretched-lifetime models”.  The basic idea is that the deaths that would have occurred 
over some period of time t occur over a longer period of time  t ) 1 ( ρ + . This model is 
summarized above in formulas (4a), (4b) and (4c). 
Consider the simple case when ρ  is one. If life expectancy was  o e  before the 
mortality improvement, then it is  o e ⋅ 2 after the improvement. That is, a cohort living 
under the new conditions will live twice as long on average. From a period perspective, 
the number of deaths in some time interval following the improvement will be half as 
many as the number of deaths in a similar time interval before the improvement. Hence, 
conventional lifetable calculations will be based on death rates that have been cut by a 
factor of two.  If death rates are the same at all ages, then cutting death rates by a factor 
of two is equivalent to stretching time by a factor of two. But if death rates change over 
age, this is not the case. In some countries women suffer about half the age-specific 
chance of death as men, but in these countries women do not live twice as long as men 
but only about six years longer. In the case of stretched lifespans when mortality 




8. Quantum and tempo vs. proportions and increments 
 So far, the word tempo has not appeared in this article. This may seem strange in a 
contribution, inspired by the work by Bongaarts and Feeney on tempo distortions, that 
is appearing in a collection of articles on tempo effects on mortality. The notion that Vaupel: Lifesaving, lifetimes and lifetables  
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there are quantum and tempo effects on fertility was developed by Norman Ryder: 
quantum refers to the number of births and tempo to the pace of childbearing. For 
demographers deeply versed in this tradition it may be useful to consider lifesaving 
from a tempo perspective. The concept of tempo effects on fertility stimulated 
Bongaarts and Feeney to question conventional calculations of life expectancy. It seems 
to me, however, that the tempo-quantum metaphor may sometimes be more misleading 
than helpful, at least in studies of mortality, and that the metaphor has to be treated with 
great caution. 
To my mind, a better starting point is the fact that all populations are 
heterogeneous and that changes in conditions will affect individuals differently. If 
mortality is reduced, then some individuals may gain no additional life, some may gain 
a little, and some may gain a lot. So a natural vantage point for me is to think (e.g., as in 
Vaupel 2002) about what proportion of people gain how much. In the case of reductions 
in period fertility, it may similarly be useful to consider how many women (and men) 
are postponing childbearing by how long (and how many are choosing not to have an 
additional child at all.) 
The three cases considered in this article—the conventional lifetable approach, the 
delayed-death model, and the stretched-lifetime model—neglect heterogeneity. In the 
conventional approach, all individuals resuscitated at some age, together with all 
individuals who would otherwise have survived this age, face the same schedule of 
mortality at subsequent ages.  The delayed-death model assumes that all individuals 
gain the same increment of life. The stretched-lifetime model slows time equally for 
everyone.  Because all populations are heterogeneous, all three perspectives are wrong. 
Nonetheless, all three perspectives may prove useful. Each of the models may provide 
serviceable approximations or bounds for at least some kinds of lifesaving interventions 
in some contexts. Alternative models that build on the theory of heterogeneous 
populations may also prove useful.  
 
 
9. Directions for research 
The conventional lifetable approach, the delayed-death model, the stretched-lifetime 
model, and various models of innate and acquired heterogeneity may all offer useful 
perspectives for understanding the fundamental nature of mortality change. Some kinds 
of change may extend a few people’s lives for an average period that may approach 
remaining life expectancy. Other kinds of change may extend many people’s lives for a 
short time. Still other kinds of change may slow the clock of aging. All populations are 
heterogeneous, so each of these kinds of changes may affect individuals somewhat 
differently. Hence it is a question of both/and rather than either/or. That is, research is Demographic Research: Volume 13, Article 24 
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not needed to determine which model is right and which models are wrong. All the 
models are wrong. The research required is research to determine which model or mix 
of models is most helpful in understanding mortality change at various ages, various 
times, and as a result of various kinds of interventions. 
There are two directions for this research: theoretical thinking about the nature of 
lifesaving and empirical analyses that test alternative theoretical hypotheses. This 
article and previously published studies about tempo effects on mortality and on the 
theory of heterogeneous populations have contributed to theoretical understanding. 
Great progress has been made in understanding how lifesaving may, theoretically, 
affect lifetimes and lifetables. The burst of innovation since Bongaarts’ and Feeney’s 
(2002) stimulating insight is greater than that in any comparable period since 1662, 
when Graunt’s seminal study was published. Theoretical research on the impact of 
lifesaving is burgeoning with vitality and fresh new growth. Further thinking will 
almost certainly produce a spate of further ideas. 
As noted in the introduction, the basic thrust of this article is that life expectancy at 
current rates will generally differ from life expectancy under current conditions when 
the following two conditions both hold. First, current mortality conditions differ from 
past mortality conditions. Second, the lives saved or lost at each age x (because of the 
change in mortality conditions) are extended or shortened by an average amount that is 
not equal to remaining life expectancy at age x at current death rates. There may be 
special circumstances when the second condition is true but the two life expectancies 
turn out to be the same. In particular, at some ages x lives might be saved for less than 
remaining life expectancy and at other ages by more and the effects might cancel out. 
Such a coincidence, however, will be unusual. Bongaarts’ and Feeney’s delayed-death 
model is a special, extreme case of the second condition. Other cases include the 
stretched-lifetime model and various heterogeneity models. The heterogeneity among 
individuals does not have to be fixed and innate: the heterogeneity can be acquired as 
individuals experience various events that weaken or strengthen them. 
Because the phrase “tempo distortions of mortality” is generally used with 
reference to the delayed-death model, some broader phrase should be used to describe 
the general fact that when mortality is changing conventional lifetables do not, except in 
special circumstances, describe the age-trajectory of mortality that a cohort would 
experience under current conditions. Let me suggest use of the phrase “the theory of 
mortality turbulence” to allude to the general phenomenon. The notion is that, except in 
special cases, mortality change creates a wake of turbulence, of disequilibrium, that 
temporarily distorts death rates. In this case, the current rates may not equal the death 
rates that will eventually prevail when the turmoil ceases. 
The turbulence could be due to various factors. In addition to delays in death, 
stretched lifespans, and the impact of differential mortality in heterogeneous Vaupel: Lifesaving, lifetimes and lifetables  
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populations, it may be the case that the longer individuals have lived under the 
unfavorable mortality regime, the more debilitated they are and the less they are to 
benefit from more favorable conditions. On the other hand, individuals who have 
survived the old regime may have been strengthened (in terms, say, of immune 
response). Such “hormesis” may enable them to benefit more from the new regime than 
cohorts born under the new regime. The shift in mortality regime may be disturbing to 
individuals: they may need time to adapt to the new conditions. For example, animals 
brought from the wild into a zoo or laboratory may suffer especially high mortality 
during an initial period. 
A broader theory of demographic disturbance might be developed to study 
transient distortions produced by fertility change, marriage change, etc. Bongaarts and 
Feeney (2005) argue that tempo distortions influence a variety of demographic rates. 
Similarly and more generally, there may be a wake of turbulence following change in 
fertility, marriage and other demographic regimes. Such turbulence will occur if period 
statistics are based on data that reflect how many events (e.g., births or marriages) are 
averted in the period but do not capture the length of time the events are postponed.  
Empirical research is required to test hypotheses arising from the theory of 
mortality turbulence. Data on cohort mortality can be used to distinguish between 
interventions that stretch lifetimes vs. those that lower age-specific mortality but do not 
decelerate the rate of increase in death rates with age (Mair et al. 2002). What are 
urgently needed are empirical tests that distinguish between the conventional view of 
lifesaving and the Bongaarts-Feeney delayed-death model. It seems clear that both 
perspectives are wrong and that true period life expectancy probably lies somewhere 
between the conventional estimate and a delayed-death estimate. But where in-
between? It may well be that for remaining life expectancy at age 30 in developed 
countries since 1950 Bongaarts and Feeney are closer to the truth. Indirectly relevant 
evidence can be advanced to support their position. The discussion, however, will 
remain speculative until direct tests can be developed. This is the key challenge today 
for basic research on mortality. 
The lightbulb experiments being conducted at the Max Planck Institute for 
Demographic Research are a first step. Experiments with various animal models, flies 
or nematode worms for instance, will also be important. As theoretical understanding of 
mortality turbulence develops and as empirical results are found in laboratory 
experiments, then it may become possible to develop and refine strategies for analyzing 
human data.  If the Bongaarts-Feeney delayed death model is consistent with the results 
of laboratory experiments, then it might also hold for human populations under some 
circumstances. More generally, the lightbulb and other experiments will help illuminate 
how the terrain of the triangle of mortality turbulence is shaped by different kinds of 
mortality change.  Demographic Research: Volume 13, Article 24 
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